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1 Introduction
An alternating-move preplay negotiation procedure for two-person games was proposed by
Bhaskar [19R9] in the context of a price-setting duopoly. The preplay proceeds as follows. One
of the players, sa.y player 1, first announces the price that he intends to take; and then player
2 announces his price. Player 1 is now given the opion of changing his price. If he does so,
player 2 can change hie price. The process continues in this manner; and it comes to an end
when one ot the two players chooses not to change his price. Bhaskar succeeded in showing
that through this proress only the monopoly price pair can be attained in equilibrium where
the equilibrium is the subgame perfect equilibrium with undominated strategies.
One of the aims of this paper is to examine the validity of the alternating-move preplay
process in other two-person games. In addition to the conditions that Bhaskar imposed on
equilibria, we require that strategies in equilibrium be Markov (or stationary). [t will be shown
that the preplay process works well in typical 2 x 2 games such as the prisoner's dilemma and a
pure coordination game. The pair of (Cooperation, Cooperation) and a Pareto optimal strategy
pair are obtained as the unique equilibrium outcome, respectively. ~rther in the price-setting
duopoly it will be shown that the monopoly price pair can be reached even if the preplay starts
(rom any pricc pair. 'I'he preplay, however, does not always work well. In fact, a sort of the
['olk 'fheorem is shown to hold in the prisoner's dilemma with continous strategy spaces: in
the game every individual rational outcome can be attained as an equilibrium outcome.
Another objective of this paper is to study the von Neumann and Morgenstern (vN - M)
stable sets in two-person strategic torm games. Recently Greenberg [1990] proposed a way
to apply vN - M stable sets, or at least its spirit, to strategic form games by appropriately
introducing a dominance relation on the space of strategy combinations- Later studies, Chwe
(1992] and Muto and Okada [1992], however, revealed that a modification of the dominance
rclation is desirable as Ilarsan,yi [1974] alread,y pointed out in his study of the vM-N stable set
in cLaracteristic function forrn games. Following Ilananyi's discussion, we will study relations
bctween vN - M stablc scts in strategic form gamcs and equilibria in thcir extended gatnes
with preplays.
The remainder of the paper is orga.nized as follows. In Section 2, the alternating-move
preplay process is described; and its rigorous formulation as an extensive form game is presented
in Section 3 together with the definition of the equilibrium concept which we use throughout
the paper. Section 4 stndies equilibria in typical 2 x 2 games, the prisoner's dilemma, a purecoordination ga.me and the batl.le of the sexes. The price-setting duopoly game is studied in
dcl.ail in Section 5. 5ection G presents a sort of the Folk Theorem in a continuous version of
Lhe prisoner's dilemma. Section ï studies relations between vN - M stable sets and equilibria
in the extended game with preplays. The paper ends in Section 8 with short remarks.
2 The Extended Game with Alternating-Move Preplays
Throughout the paper we will work on the following two-person game:
G - (N - {1,2},{X;};-[,2,{u;};-[,2)
wltere N - {1,2} is the set of players, X;, i- 1,2, is player i's action set and u;, i- 1,2, is
player i's pa,yoff function, i.e., a real valued function on .X - X] x XZ. We assume u; takes
nonnegative values.
The altorna.ting-mnve preplays, proposed hv Hhaskar [19R9], proceed as follows. One of the
playcrs, sa,y playcr l, moves first and announces the action x[ E.,~1 that he intends to take.
1'he first player to move is determined in advance of the preplays.t Then player 2 announces
an action x2 E.k2. Player 1 now has the option of changing his action to x~. If he does so,
player 2 can cha.nge his a,ction to x2 and so on. The preplay process comes to an end when any
of the two players chooses not to change.
Let zk -(x„x2) bo the action combination a,t the end of the kth period. I'or convenience
let xt - x~ : x~ is the action that player 1 announces at the lst period. Suppose the preplay
process ends at the I~th period with player i's turn; thus xh-1 - xh. Then since player f
chooses not to move, he is satisfied with his action x;` - xh-Z against j's action x!`~ - xx-t
Further player j's action x~-' is his response to player i's x;'.-Z. Thus both players are
satisfied with the action combination xh . Pla;yer i will be paid u;(xK), i- 1, 2. Ifthe equadity
x~' - x~'-t never arises, then the game will go on indefinitely. In this event, we define the
players' payoffs arc zero.z
Ilereaftc~r, we will call this alternaling-move game the cxtended game of C.
']f the game is synunetric with respect to players, such as the price-setting duopoly game that Bhaskar [1989]
studied, it does uot rnatl.er who moves first. hi asymmetric games, ofcourse, final ontcomee are dependent upmt
who maves first. See the bxule of the sexes in Section 3.
~Following Bha-ckar [1989] and Harsanyi [1974], we assume this rather artificial condition on players' payoffs.
See Section 8 concerning this assumption.f
3 Formal Desc.ription of the Extended Game
In thc (ollowing we doscrihe tho extended garne in which player 1 moves first. Thus in thc
following playcr 1(playcr 2, resp.) moves in odd (even, resp.) number of periods. The game
in which pla,yer 2 moves first is described in the same manner.
3.1 Strategies and Payoffs
Take the kth period, and suppose actions announced up to the (k - 1)st period are
x„x2,x~,...,xk-~ where i. is the player who moved at the (k - 1)st period. Then the ac-
tion combination x~ at the end of the Ith period is given by
~ ~(x2~,xi) if l is odd and 11 3
x -
(r~-~,xz) if l is even.
The histor,y up to the (k - 1)st period is written as hk-~ -(x~,x2,...,xk-~). Let the set of
all possible hk by Hk, a.nd let tI - ~Jk o Hk where 11o - {e} and e denotes the empty history.
Players' strategiex, donotrd by a~ fnr playor I and nj for player 2, are maps such Uiat
~
o, : U tt~k --. .x,
k-0
and
oZ : ~ Hskti y ~2
k-o
A strategy combination (a~,oZ) is denoted by o. The set of adl starategies of player 1(player
2, resp.) is denoted by ~1(~~, resp.). The outcome (action combination) path induced by a
strategy combination o is denoted by R(o).
Player i'x payo(f iuidor a stratogy rombination a is given by
I~(o) -
u;(z) if n(n) is of finite lenfith, i.e., if the game
ends after a finite number of periods:
z is the final outcome, i.e., z- xh when the game ends at the Iith period
0 otherwise.a
3.2 Subgames
The exteuded game is a gatne with per[ect information; and thus games starting from each
move of players are subgames. Let h be a liistory up to the (k - 1)st period, and denote by
[(h) the subgame starting from the kth period after the history h. Let o;(h), á- 1, 2, be player
i's strategy in I'(h), and let o(la) - (a~(h),o2(h)). Denote by a(o(h)) the outcome path in
I'(le) induced by n(h). Playcr i's payoffs in I'(h) under a(h) are given by
u;(z) if n(o(h)) is of finite length:
f,h(o(Iz)) - z is the final outcome in the path n(o(h))
0 otherwise.
3.3 Equilibrium
Similarly to Bhaskar [1989], we require equilibrium strategies to be subgame perfect and also
require that in equilibria the strategies played after any history should not be weakly dominated.
The latter is defined in the following manner. Take a subgame I'(h), and take player á's two
strategies o;(h) and a;(le) in P(h). We say that o;(h) weakly dominates o;(h) in I'(h) if
(]) fh((Oi(It~,O~(h.))) 1,~h((Ui(ÍL),(T)(IA))) foi all playeT ~'S Strateg109 O~({1) m f(Í1), and (2)
J!`((m,(h),a~(h))) ~ J;`((o,(h),o~(h)) for at Icast onc a~(h) in I'(h). The serond condition that
Bhaskar imposed requires that if a-(oi,o2) is the equilibrium, then the following hold for
both players i- 1,2: in each subgame I(h), there is no strategy of player i which dominates
o; ~ h in I(h) where a; ~ h is the restriction of o; to the subgame I(h).
[n addition to the two conditions, we require equilibrium strategies to be Markov (or sta-
tionary) and conscrvative.
A player's strategy is ca.lled Markov if ea.ch action induced by the strategy depends only
on a, preva,iling action combinat.ion. Thus player 1's (player 2's, resp.) Markov strategy is a
function from {e} ~J.k" to .k't (from X~ ~).t to X2, resp.). We will hereafter use p~ and p2 to
denote Markov strategies of players 1 and 2.
The restriction to Markov strategies greatly simplifies the analysis since interactions of
players' stra,tegies are kept as simple as possible. But a more important reason for imposing
thc Markov property comes from one of the objectivati of thc paper, that. is, t.he study of the
vN - M stable set or its variants in strategic form games from the viewpoint of equilibria in
their extended games with preplays. Since the vN - M stable set is a static solution concept,;
we want the stability being independent of the history o( preplay negotiations.3
A mathematical justification ot restricting to the Markov strategy was given in Harsanyi
[1974, Lemmas 6 and 7]. That is, if p-(p~,p2) is a Nash equilibrium when players are
restricted to using the Markov strategies, then p is still an equilibrium even if each player is
(ree to use any strategy in E, (not necessarily Markov).
The conservativeness, initially defined by i{arsanyi [1974], assumes that each player never
moves unless he will positively benefit from this move. 'The assumption arises also from the
study of the vN - d4 stable set: it assumes such consen.ativeness in its definition. Formally
the conservativeness is defined in the following manner. Take a strategy combination p', and
a subgame I'(hk) which follows the history hk -(x~,xZ,...,xk) up to the kth period. p' is
called conservative in ['(hk) if the following hold. Let ~ be the final outcome in P(hk) under the
restriction of p' to this subgame: z may be an infinite sequence of outcomes. Then ( 1) z- xk
or (2) If 2k}1 xk}2 (ik}1 ik}2 ., resp.) is the sequence of outcomes (oí corresponding
players, resp.) under p', then
u;~(z) ~ u;i(x~-t) for all !- k t l,k f 2,...
except for !- li or I~ - 1 wherc h is the period that the game cnds.
Since payoffs are nonnegative and further in case the game never ends they are zero, the
game must end after a finite number of steps if a pair of players' strategies is conservative.
A strategy combination p- (pt,p2) is called a conservative Markov perfect equilibrium,
denoted by CMPE hcrea(ter, of the extended game if it satisfies the four conditions above, i.e.,
1. p is subgame perfect;
2. pt,p2 are not weakl,y dominated in each subgame;
3. pt,p1 are Markov strategies; and
4. p is conservative in each subgame.
'Other defenaea of ancuming the Markov property, in particular, in analyzing duopoly marketa, are found in
Maskin and Tirole [1988j.s
The restriction to htarkov strategies makes it possible to describe subgames in a simpler
way. That is, it is sufficient to make clear starting action combination x and player i to move
first. '1'hus subgames will hereafter be denoted by I'(x,i),x E X,i - 1,2. I'(e, 1)(I'(e,2), resp.)
is the whole extended ga.me starting from the move of player 1(player 2, resp.).
We say p- (p~,pz) is a CMPE in the subgame I'(x,i) if p,'s are Markov and p satisfies
(1),(2),(4) above in each subgame of P(z,i).
4 Typical Two-Person Games and the CMPE
In this section, we appl,y the preplay to typical two-person games: the prisoner's dilemma, a
pure coordination game and the battle of the sexes.
4.1 The Prisoner's Dilemma
Consider the following prisoner's dilemma G'~ and its extended games.




Proposition 4.1: Let p' be n CMPE in P(e,i),i - 1 or 2. Then the following must hold.
pi(CC) - C, pi(CD) - D, p~(DC) - D, p~(DD) - D,
pá(CC) - C, p~(CD) - D, pz(DC) - D, pz(DD) - D.
That is, pla;yer 1(player 2, resp.) changes his action only at the outcome CD(DC, resp.).
Figure 4.1 depicts p~,p2 and the induced movements.
Therefore the subgames 1'(CC,1) and P(CC, 2) end at the outcome CC; I'(CD, 2)(T(DC,1),
resp.) ends at CI)(DC, resp.); and P(CD,1),P(DC,2),P(DD,1) and I'(DD,2) end at DD.'o o ~o`' ~
CC CD CC CD c~ ~
CC CD L L
0 0 0-~ o o-~ o r DC R- ( DD T DC DD ~ DCT DD
Pí Pz
induced movements
Figure 4.1: p~,p2 and the indured movements
Proof: 1'ake first the subga.me I'(CD,2). Since pla,yer 2 gains his maximal pa,yofí 5 at CD,
we must have p'z(CD) - D by the conservativeness.4 Similarly p~(DC) - D follows. Then by
the subgame perfectness we have p~(DD) - D since player 1's pa.yoff is 1 at DD but it is 0
at CD: if player 1 moves, the game ends at CD since p2(CD) - D. Similarly p2(DD) - D
holds. Next take I'(CD, 1). Then if player 1 moves, the game ends at DD since p2(DD) - D.
Since his payoffs are 0 at CD and 1 at DD, we must have p~(CD) - D by the subgame
perfectness. Simila,rly p1(DC) - D. Finally again by the subgame perfectness we obtain
Pi(CC) - Pz(CC) - C. Q.E.D.
On the basis of Proposition 4.1, we may show that in the whole game every CMPE produces
the unique outcome CC.
~This can be shown also b,y using the condition that no weakly dominated strategies be used in equilíbria.
As for the proposilions concerning lhe three ? x 2 games in this sedion, only one of these two conditions is
necessary to prove them. In the price-selting duopoly to be st.udied in the next section, both conditions are
nccesxary lo provc main proposilions.x
Proposition 4.2: lnkc Ihc ináolc grnne ['(r, í), i- 1 or 2. Tlten every CiYIPE in C(e, i)
iiaduces CC ns íls final m~lrome.
Proof: Take a CMPE p' and a subgame starting from the second period. This subgame is
I'(C,j) or T(D, j),j ~ i, depending on the player i's choice in the first period. Take first the
game I'(C,j). Then, from Proposition 4.1, the following hold. If j chooses C, then the game
ends at CC and j gets the payoff 4; while if he chooses D, then the game ends at DD with
payoff 1. Thus we must have pZ(C) - C. Take next the game P(D,j). In this case, the game
ends at DD irrespective of pla,yer j's choice: recall Proposition 4.1. Thus p~(D) - C or D.
Pinally take the game I'(e,i). If i chooses C, then the game ends at CC and he gets the
payoff 4; while if he chooses D, then the game ends at DD where his payoff is 1. Thus p;(e)
must be C.
Therefore every CMPE induces CC as its final outcome. Q.E.D.
Remark 4.1:
(1) It is easily seen from the discussions in the proofs of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 that p'
constructed in these propositions are CMPE.
(2) There are two outcomes CC and DD which are stable in the sense that neither player has
an incentive to move. In the whole game, however, only one of them, i.e., CC, is realized;
and further this holds irrespective of the order of players' moves, i.e., who moves first. In
games with continuous action spaces, however, the multiplicity of stable outcomes may cause
the multiplicity of equilibria in the whole game. See Section 6 for details.
4.2 A Pure Coordination Game
Consider the following pure coordination game G2 and its extended games.




Proposition 4.3: hrl p' Gc a CAlPE. Then the jollawing mu.ct hald.
pi(UL) - U, pi(UR) - D, pi(DL) - U, pi(DR) - U,
pz(UL) - L, p2(UR) - L, pz(DL) - R, pz(DR) - L.
That is, each player changes his action except when he is at UL. Figure 4.2 depicts pi, pz and
the induced movements.
Therefore a.ll subga.mes of the form I'(x, i), x- UL, UR, DL, DR, i- 1, 2, end at the out-
come UL.
~ 0 ~ F~ 0 ~ ~~ p
UL UR UL UR UL UR
~ i~ ~ ~- ~-
0 0 0 0 0 0
DL DR DL -~ DR DL -~1 DR
Pi PZ induced movements
Figure 4.2: pi, p2 and the induced movements
Proof: This proposition is proved in a similar manner to the proof of Proposition 4.1 by the
use of the subgame perfectness and the conservativeneas.
Proposition 4.4: Take the whole game I(e, i), i- 1 or 2. Then every CMPE in I'(e, i)
induces UL as its unique final outcome.
Proof: This is clear from Proposition 4.3. We may take either L or R for player 2, and either
U or D for player 1 in their choices in the first two periods. Q.E.D.
r 1T
Remark .f.y: It is easily seen that the p' constructed in the propositions above are CMPE.10
4.3 The Battle of the Sexes
Considcr the following battle of the sexes C3 and its extended games.




Proposition 4.5: Let p' be a CMPE. Then the folloming must hold.
Pi(UL) - U. Pi(C!R) - D, Pi(DL) - U, Pi(DR) - U,
pz(UL) - R, p~(C!R) - L, p~(DL) - R, pz(DR) - R.
That is, player 1(player 2, resp.) chooses not to change his action only at I!L (DR, resp.).
Figure 4.3 depicts pi,p2 and the induced movements.
Therefore the subgames F((lL,1), I'(DL,1), F( DR,1) and F(ClR,2) end at the outcome UL;
and the subgames F(ClL,2),F(ClR,1),P(DL,2), and F(DR,2) end at DR.
`o' o o ~ o ~o~~ o
UL UR UL UR UL UR
~ ~~ ~ W~
0 0 0-~ o o-~ o
DL DR DL DR DL DR
Pi Ps induced movements
Figure 4.3: pi,p2 and the induced movements
Prooï: This proposilion is proved in a similar manner to the proof of Proposition 4.1.11
'I'he next proposition shows that fiual outcomes induced by CMPE may depend on which
player moves first.
Proposition 4.8: hi the who(e gnme P(e, 1), every CMPE induces the outcome DR; whi(e in
F(e,2), every CMPE indnces UL.
Proof: Take any CMPE p'. First consider the game T(e, l). Take the subgame F(U, 2) starting
from the second period. If player 2 chooses L, then the game ends at UL since pi(UL) - U:
player 2 gets 1 at UL. If he chooses R, then the play proceeds (IR -~ DR and stops at DR
since pi(UR) - D and p~(DR) - R: player 2 gets 2. Hence pz((~) - R.
Take next the subgame F(D,2). tf player 2 chooses L, then the play proceeds DL y UL -.
UR y DR and stops at DR; while if he chooses R, then the play proceeds DR -~ UR -~ UL
and stops at UL. Player 2 gains the payoff 1 at UL and 2 at DR. Thus we must have
pz(D) - L.
Finally ta.ke the whole game I(e,l). If pla,yer 1 chooses U, then the game ends at DR.
Even if he chooses L, the game ends also at DR. Thus every CMPE induces DR as its final
outcome.
The latter half of the proposition is similarly proved. Q.E.D.
Renenrk 4.3: "Che p' defined in the propositions are easily shown to be CMPE.
4.4 Stability and Semi-Stability of Outcomes
The three examples show that in CMPE there may exist two types of final outcomes. The
outcomes CC in the prisoner's dilemma and (~L in the pure coordination are of the first type;
and the outcomes UL and DR in the battle of the sexes are of the second type. In the former,
neither pla.yer has a.n incentive to deviate; while in the latter only one player who ie to move
prefers not to move: another player has an incentive to move. Hereafter the former type of
outcome will be called sta.ble; and the latter type semi-stable. Symbols Ii(p) and lí'(p) will
be used to denote the sets of these stable outcomes, i.e.,
Ií(p)-{xEX:p;(x)-x; for i-1,2}1'2
and
h'(p) -{r. E X: p;(x) - a; and pi(.x) ~ ri}.
In each subgame, ever,y final outcome induced by a CMPE p must be stable or semi-stable,
i.e., nmst be in I~(p)~JI~'(p). It is not necessary, however, that every stable outcome is a
final outcome: recall the outcome DD in the prisoner's dilemma. Further the set lí (p) may be
empty as shown in the battle of the sexes. Later in Section 7 relations between stable outcomes
and the vN - M stable set. in the action combination space will be studied.
5 A Price-Setting Duopoly and the CMPE
In this section we stud,y the CMPE in a price-setting duopoly. We assume the following
symmetric duopoly. Two firms 1,2 are producing homogeneous goods with the sa.me marginal
cost c. For simplicity, let c- 0 in what follows. Consumers' demands are represented by a
demand function D(p). D(p) is decreasing in p, and there exists a price p such that D(p) - 0
for all p ? p. The market profit at price p is a(p) - pD(p), and a(0) - a(p) - 0. Suppose
~r(p) is continuous and strictly concave. Then there is a unique price pm, called the monopoly
price, which maximizes a(p). Denote firm 1's (firm 2's, resp.) price level by pl(p2, resp.). If
their prices are equal, they split even the market profit; otherwise all sales go to a lower pricing
firm. This duopoly market is written as the following two-person game:
GB - (N - {1,2},{X;};-r,z,{u;};-r,~)
where X; - [O,p] for é- 1,2,
and
u; :.k' - X~ x X2 y Rt (nonnegative reals) defined by
a(p;) if P~ G Pi
u;(P;,Pi) - ~(P;)~2 iC p; - Pi for i,7 - I,2, i~ 7
0 if p; 1 pi.
Throughout this section, we assume that player (firm) 1 is first to move. But, needless to
say,the same results hold even if player 2 moves first because of their symmetry.
Bhaskar [1989] showed that every perfect equilibrium of the whole extended game oí GB
produces the unique outcome ( pm pm) i e., the pair of the monopoly price5. Here the per-
fect equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium that has no weakly dominated strategy inIa
any subgame; but neit.her the Markov property nor the conservativeness is assumed.s In the
following, we will show that in every CMPE the monopoly price pair can be reached in every
subgame, i.e., the monopoly price pair can be reached even if we start preplays with an arbi-
trarily chosen price pair.
Rernark 5.1: The existence of a CMPE in which the monopoly price can be reached from an
arbitra,ry chosen price pair was already shown in Bhaskar (1989, Proposition 1]. Though he
did not assume the Markov property, the strategies that he constructed in the proposition are
tilarkov.
Bcfore prasenting the ma.in results, we first prove a sequence of lemmas. The p-(p1,p2)
which will appear in 1he Iommas is an a.rbitra,r,y choscn CMPE of I'(e, 1).
Lemma 5.1: 6 Tnke a sutx~ame 1'(po, i), po E.k~, i- 1 or 2. Let p' 6e the final outcome induced
6y p in the subgame. Then the following hold.
1 If p" - po then u~e never have 0 G po ~ po
2. If p" ~ po, then neither 0 G p~ G p; nor 0 G p; G p~ holds.
Proof:
1. Suppose 0 G po G po holds. Since the subgame ends at po, player i gets the payoff 0.
Define p; by
r J Pi if Pi 1 Pi
P;(P) -
ll
Then it gives player 1 at least payoff 0 in I'(po,i). Further it gives him a positive payoff
p; otherwise.
SAs far ay I see, the two conditions lhat Bhaskar imposed on equilibrium are not enough to show the
m~iqueness o[ the equilihrinm ontcome. More conditions, say the conservativeness, seem to be necessary.
sThis lemma corresponds to Proposition ?a of Bhaskar [7989]. The Bhaskar's two conditions seem to be
insufficient to prove the lemma.l-1
if playcr j uses the same sort of stra[egy p'~, i.e.,
P; if Pi ~ P~
P~(P) -
p~ otherwise.
Thus p; is weakly dominatcd b,y p;, a rontradiction.
2. Without loss of generality, suppose pr(p') - pi and the game ends at player 1's turn.
If 0 ~ p2 C pi, then a contradiction follows in the same manner as in 1. Suppose
0 G p~ G p2. Then player 2' payoff is 0. Since p' ~ pn and the game ends at 1's turn, we
must have p' -(pj, pz) satisfying tlie following:
Pi - Pi and Pi ~ P2; and
player 2 is the player to move at ]i.
The conservativeness in I'(p',2) implies that in the final outcome p" player 2 must get
more than in p'. Thus we have a contradiction since player 2 gets 0 at p' and gets at
least 0 in p'. Q.E.D.
Remnrk 5. ~: Lemma 5.1 shows that under any CMPE if a subgame C(p, i) ends at p' different
from p, then p; - p~ or min(p; , p~ )- 0. In the former case, each firm gets the highest payoff
when p" -(p"` pn`); and in the latter each firm gets 0.
Lemma 5.2: Pi(Pm~Pm) - P2(P"`,P~`) - P~`.
Proof: This is clear from Remark 5.2 a.nd the conserva,tiveness of p in I'((p"`,p"`),i), i- 1,2.
Before stating the next Icmma, we introduce notation p"`- and pmt. pm- (p"`t, resp.) is
the price less than ( greater than, resp.) pm which gives a lower pricing firm the half of the
monopoly profit; i.e., p"`- and pm} satisfY ~(P~`-) - n(Pm}) -~(P~`)I2 and pm- C pm G pmt.
Since a is continuous and strictly concave and a(0) -~r(p) - 0, the existence and the unique-
ness of pm- and p"`f follow.l:í
Remark 5.3: The following fact is also easily seen. When p; G p„u;(p;,p~) ~ u;(pn`, p"`) holds
if and only if pm- C p; G pmt.
Lemma 5.3:
i. For every p-( pi , p"` ), 0 G pl C pm- or pm C pi , the final outcome under p in the
subgame I'(P, 1) kc (P'",p~`).
2. For every p-(p"`,p2),0 C p2 G p"`- or pm G p2, the ftnal outcome under p in the
suógame I'(p,2) is (pm p,.`)
Proof:
1. B,y Lemma 5.2, if pla,yer 1 chooses pm, then the game ends and he gets u;(pm pn`) -
a(pm)~2. Thus the final outcome under p must guarantee player 1 at least the payoff
u;(p"`,p"`). By Remark 5.2, thus the final outcome must be (pm,pm). Note that if
0 C pl G pm- or p"` G pi, player 1 gets less than u;(p"`,pm) when he chooses not to
move at p.
2. is similarly shown. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5.4:
1. For every p-(p~,0), the finnl outcome under p in the subgame I'(p, 1) is (p"` p"`)
2. F'or enery p-( O, p2), the final oulrome imdcr p in tlte suógame I'(p,2) is (pm p"`)
Proof:
1. Suppose player 1 chooses pm in his first move in T(p, 1). Then the subgame P((p"`,0),2)
follows. Then by Lemma .5.3 the final outcome of I'((pm,0), 2) will be (p"`, pm ). By
R.emark 5.2, the final outcome of I'(p, 1) must be (pn` pm)
2. is similarly shown. Q.E.D.Ifi
Lemma 5.5: Take a price pair p-(p1,p2),pi iE p2. Suppose p; C pl. Then the final outcome
untler p in I'(p, j) is (p"` pm)
Proof: Suppose player j chooses price 0 in hia first move in I'(p, j). Then the subgame
I'((p~,0),i) follows. By hemma 5.4 the final outcome of 1'((p;,0),i) will be (pm,p"`). By
Remark 5.2 the final outcome of I'(p,j) must be (p"`,pm). Q.E.D.
Lemma 5.6: For ench (p,p), p~ pm, the final outcome under p in T((p,p),i),i - 1,2, is
(p~` P~ )
Proof: Take any (p,p),p ~ p"`, and take the subgame I((p,p), i). Suppose player i chooses 0.
Then the subgame t((0,p),2) follows. Thus by Lemma 5.4 the final outcome must be (pm pm)
Hence by Remark 5.1 the final outcome in I'((p,p),i) must be (pm,pm). Q.E.D.
Lemma 5.7: Take a subgame I'(p,i) wilh p-(pi,p2),pm- C p; C p"`},p; G p~. Then
p;(p) - p;. Thus player i chooses not to move, and the game ends at p.
Proof: If i does not move, the game ends and he gains u;(p~,pZ) 1 u;(pn`,pn`). If he moves at
p, he will get at most u;(p"` pm) in the final outcome of I'(p,i): recall Remark 5.2. Thus by
the conservativeness player i does not move. Q.E.D.
From these lemmas, the proposition follows which shows that under every CMPE, the fol-
lowing holds: in each price pair other than the pair of the monopoly prices, at least one player
has an incentive to move, a.nd his move induces a sequential movement of prices which eventu-
a.lly reaches the monopoly price pair.
Proposition 5.8: Let p- (pi, p1J be n CAfPE ojT(e, l) and take a price pair (p~,pz). Then
the sulx~ames I'((pi,pz),i),i - 1,2, has the final outcome (pn`,p"`) underp, ezcept when pm- G
p; G p"`t and p; G p~; and ij ihis is the case the suógame ends at (pt,pZ).17
Proof: The claim easily follows from I.emmas 5.1 - 5.7.
Rernark 5.4: It follows also from the lemmas that under every CMPE p the monopoly price
pair (p"`,p"`) is the unique stable outcome, and price pairs (p~,pz) satisfying pm- G p; C p"`}
aud p; C p~,i,j - 1,2, are semi-stable outcomes.
We now pick up the first two periods of the game, and examine players' choices. The next
proposition is for player 2's decision in the second period.
Proposition 5.9: Let p- (p~,p2) 6e a CMPE of I'(e,l). Take pt with p"`- G pt G p"`}.
Then p2(pt) G pt must hold, and the subgame I'(p1,2) has the Jinal outcome (pm,pm) under p.
Proof: Suppose p2 - p2(pi) 1 pt. Then Lemma 5.7 shows that p~(pi, p2) - pl and the game
ends at (pt,p2). Player 2 gets 0. If pz - p2(pt) C pt, then Proposition 5.8 shows that the final
outcome in the subgame T((pt,p2),1) under p is (p"`, p"`) in which player 2 gets a(pn`)~2 ~ 0.
Thus p2(p~ ) L p~ must hold. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5.10: Let p- (pi,p2) 6e a CA4PE of I'(e, I ). Then p(ayer 1's choice p~(e) in the
first period can be arbifrnry; and the gan:e ends at the monopo(y price pair (pm,p"`) irrespective
of his choice.
Proof: This is clear from Propositions .S.R and 5.9.
6 The Prisoner's Dilemma with Continuous Action Spaces -
A Folk Theorem
So far we ha.ve shown that the alterna,ting-move prepla,y process works well in various examples.
It succeeds in reaching an outcome that is favorable to both players: (C,C) in the prisoner's
dilemma, the Pareto efticient outcomes in the pure coordination and in the price-setting duopoly
game.18
'I'he following discussion, howevc.r, rcveals that the preplay does not always lead to such
ontcomes. It will be shown that in thc prisoner's dilemma with continuous action spaces, every
iudividuallv rational outcome could be attained as a final outcome of a CMPE: a sort oí Folk
theorem holds.
Example 6.1: GrD - (N - {1,2},{X;};-1,z,{u;};-1,z) where
X; -[0,1], the closed interval between 0 and 1, i- 1,2,
u~(x~.xz) - 1- xi t 4xz, and
uz(x~,xz) - 1 - xz t 4x1 for (x~,x2) E X- XL x Xz.
The game is the mixed extension of the prisoner's dilemma given in Example 4.1
As for the payoffs, we state the following simple but usetul facts without proofs.
I'act (i.l: For a.ny fixed x;,~y(x~,xz) is decreasing in x~, for i,7 - 1,2,i - j. Thus it is easily
seen that x; - 0 is thc player i's maxmin action, i- 1,2, and that (x~,xz) - (0,0) is the
unique Nash equilibrium.
In what follows we call outcomes (xL,xz) with u;(xl,xz) 1 1(- u;(0,0)),i - 1,2, individu-
ally rational.
Fact 6.2: For each (x~,xz), take the line with slope 4 which passes through (xl,xz). Then
player 1's payoS in each outcome on the line is the same as ul(xi,xz); and his payoíf is bigger
(smaller, resp.) than u~(xl,xz) if an outcome is above (below, resp.) the line. For player 2,
take the line with slope 4. Then his payoff is the same as uz(x~,xz) in each outcome on the
line; and it is bigger (smaller, resp.) than uz(x~,xz) if an outcome is to the right (leít, resp.)
of the line. See Figure fi.l.19
A
isoprofit line for u~(xt,z~)
ieoprofit line for ut(xt,xz)
Figure 6.1: Tsoprofit lines
We now take a.ny monotone a.nd continuous curve connecting (0,0) (the point O) with a
point on the edge EC or the edge DC where D -(1, á) and F-( 4,1). Thus OD(OE, resp.)
is the isoprofit line of ut(0,0) - 1(uz(0,0) - 1, resp.); and for every outcome ( xt,xz) in
ODG'E,ul(xt,xz),uq(xt,xz) ~ I. See Figure 6.2. The monotonicity implies that each player's
payoff never decreases as we move from (0,0) to the other end point. Note that each outcome
on the line OD(OE, resp.) gives player 1(player 2, resp.) the constant payoff 1. Define
P - (Pt,Pz) ~ follows.
I. If (xi,:cz) is ou the rurve, t.hru p;(xt,xz) - x;,i - 1,2;
Y. if (xt,:cz) ix lo Lhe righL of Ihe eurve, t.hen pi(xi,x2) - xi~Pz(xt,xx) - xx; and
3. if (xt,xz) is abovc the curve, then pt(xt,xz) - xt,pz(xt,xz) - x~.
Ilere x~(x2, resp.) is the value such that (x~,xz)((xt,x2), resp.) is on the curve. See Figure
6.2. Such x~ and x2 are uniquely determined because of Fact 6.1 and the monotonicity of the
curve. Then the following proposition holds.zo
1
0 1
Figure 6.2: Illustratíon of pl and pz
Proposition 8.3: The p defined above is a CMPE for every subgame F(x,i),x E X and
i - 1,2.
Proof: It is clear trom Facts 6.1 and G.2.
We now show the main result of this section.
Proposition 8.4: Far each z-(xi,xz) E X with u~(x),uz(x) ~ 1, there exists at least one
CMPE p which attains x as its unique final outcome in the whole game F(e, l).
Proof: Take any action combina.tion x' -(x„x2) E X with ie;(x') ? l,á - 1,2. Take the
isoprofit line (w.r.t. player 1) FC. passing through x'. See Figure 6.3. The outcome G(F,
resp.) is on the edge ECD (on the line OE, resp.) and the line FG has the slope 4; recall
Fact 6.2. The points F and G are ((-xi ~ 4x2)~15,4(-x~ t 4x2)~15) (1,(1 - x~ t 4xz)~4),
respectively. It is easily observed that when we go from the outcome O to the outcome G
via F, player 2's payoff is consta,nt and 1's payoff increases on OF, while on FG player 1's
payoff is constant and 2's payoff increases. Thus the OFG is a monotone and continuous curve
connecting the outcome O and the outcome C on the edge F.CD. Therefore by Proposition 6.3
the p-(pi, pz) defined below is a CMPE for each subgame of the form P(x, i),x E X, i- 1,2.
For each x - (xi,xz),21
1. if (.x~,x~) is on OFG, then p;(xr,xz) - x„i - 1,2;
1. if (x~,x2) is to thc right of OFG, then p~(xl,xZ) - x„pz(xr,x~) - xz; and
3. if (x~,x2) is abovc OFG, then pi(xr,x2) - z~,py(x~,x2) - x2,
where xi and i1 are the outcomes such that (x~,xz) and (xr,xz) are on OFG.
Take now the subgame I'(xr,2) stazting from the 2nd period. Then for each xr E
~r,p2(xr) - x2 where xZ is such that (xr,xz) is on OFG constitntes a CMPE in the sub-
game 1'(xr,2) together with the p sa.tisfying 1, 2 and 3 above. In fa.ct, ta.ke x'2 such that
(x~,x2) is above OFG, then by the defiuition of pr(x~,22) player 1 chooses not to move; and
the game ends at (x~,x2). Player 2 gets less than the pa;yofi at (xr,x~) on OFG: recall Fact
6.1. Supposc next (x~,x2) is to the right of OFG. Then again from the definition of pr(xr,x2)
player 1 changes xi to xi such that (xi, x2) is on OFG; and then the game ends. Player 2's pay-
off at (xi,x2) is clearly not more than that at (xr,x2). See Figure 6.3. Therefore pZ(xl) - xz










Figure 6.3: Dlustration of pz(xr)
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l'inally take the wholc game 1'(e,l). Then undcr p-(p~,pz) defined above, for each
x~ E Xi, player 2 takes xZ such that (x~,x2) is on OFG, and then the game ends. By the
definition o( OF .C,, pla.ycr 1's payoff is constant on the line FG, which is larger than his payoff
on OF. Thus if p~(e) - xr,(-x~ } 4x2)~15 G x~ G 1, then this pr(e) constitutes a CMPE in2z
the whole game together with the pr,pz defined above. In particular, we can obtain the desired
one by letting pr(e) - x~. Q.E.D.
Remark 6.1: Proposition holds also for I'(e,2), the game in which player 2 first moves. Take
the isoprofit line for player 2; then similar arguments follow.
The next proposition shows that there exists no CMPE that induces an outcome in which
u, or u2 is strictly less than 1, i.e., an outcome not being individually rational. Such outcomes
arc in the regions OAD or OI1E in Figure 6.1. We first prove a lemma.
Lemma 6.5: For enery Cb1PE p of I'(e,i), i- 1,2, u~e must have pl(0,0) - p2(0,0) - 0.
Proof: Suppose w.l.o.g. pr(0,0) - x~ ~ 0. Take the subgame P((0,0),1) and suppose the game
ends at x' -(x„ x2) under p. By the conservativeness, the subgame ends after a finite number
of steps, and further ur(z') ~ ut(0,0) - 1. Since ur(xI,O) G 1, player 2 must be involved in
the path from (0,0) to x'. Let the path of outcomes from (0,0) to x' and the corresponding
sequence of players be (O,O) - xu,xr, ..,xk-r,xk - x' and it, ..,ik, respectively. Note that
ir - 1 and k 7 2. Suppase first i~ - 1; and the game ends in player 2's turn. Then from Fact
6.1 we must have x~ - x~ G x~-t. If otherwise, player 1 chooses not to move at xk-1. Then
the game ends at xk-r and he gets more payoff, which contradicts that p is a CMPE. Since
ik-1 - 2, we have x2-~ ~ x2 by the same reason. Thus we never reach (0,0), which implies
that we never have such a. path from (0, 0) to x'. When ik - 2, a similar proof applies. Q.E.D.
Proposition 6.6: Fnr every CAIPL' p of I'(e,i), i- 1,2, each player gets a payojjgreater than
nr equal to ! in thr fina! nutcome.
Proof: Suppose w.l.o.g. there is a CMPF, p such that ur(x) G 1 holds in the final outcome x
of thc whole cxtended garne Suppose first the game ends in player 1's turn; hence, pt(x) - xt.
'1'ake the subgame I'(x, 1). Then the subgame ends at x and player 1 gets the payoff ut(x) G 1.
Suppose he chooses 0 instead. Then the subgame I((O,x~),2) follows. If p2(O,xz) - 0, then
by Lemma 6.5 the game ends at (0, 0). Player 1 can thus increase his payoff, a contradiction.
Suppase p2(O,x2) - x2 ~ 0. Since pla,yer 2 can get the pa,yoff 1 by choosing 0, the final
outcome must guarantce him a payo(i' greater Lhan or equal to 1. Since his payo(f at (O,xz) is2s
less Lha,u I, playor I's move must follow. 'I'hns the final outcome must gnarantee playc,r I a.
pa,yoff grcater Lhan ui(O,x2) which is greater than 1. Hence player 1 can increase his payoff
also in this case, a contradiction.
Suppose next the game ends in player 2's turn. Then we must have (xi,x2) such that
p~(xy,x2) - x~. Take the subgame I'((x„x2),1); then a similar proof applies. Q.E.D.
7 Final Outcomes under CMPE and Stable Sets
Iu this section, we examine relations between stable outcomes under CMPE and the stable
sets originally defined by von Neumann and Morgenstern [1953], hereafter denoted by vN - M
sl.ablc set, in the outcomes space, i.e., in the space of action pairs.
Similarly to Croenbert; [1~9(1], ('hwe~ [l~S)2] and bfuto a.nd Okada [1992], wo define a binary
rola,tiou, ca.lled the dominance rela,tion, on I,he outcome spa.cc in the following manner. 'I'ake
two outcomes x-(xt,x2) and y- (y~,y2) E X. We say that x is induced from y by player i,
denoted x~-~; y, if x~ - y~, for i,j - 1,2,i - j.
Definition 7.l (Domination): For x,y E X and player i- 1,2, x dominates y via i, denoted by
xdom;y if (1) x t-~; y and (2) u;(x) ~ u;(y). We simply say x dominates y, denoted xdomy, if
xdonxry or xdom2y.
Defiiaition 7.2 (The v.N - hf stable set w.r.t. dom): A set V C,X is a stable set w.r.t. dom if
the following two conditions are satisfied. (1) For any two outcomes x,y in V, neither xdomy
nor ydonzx; and (2) for any z not in V, there exists x E V such that xdomz. (1) and (2) are
called internal and external sta.bility, respectively.
Muto and Okada [1992] applied the vN - M stable set w,r.t. dom to the price-setting
duopoly; and they showed that unreasona.ble outcomes may be included in the stable set.
They claimed that, to remove out these outcomes, one must take into account not only a direct
domination but a.lso a. sequence of players' reactions that may ensue after a player changes his~
action. I{arsa,nyi [1cJ7-1] alrea,dy pointed out the necessity of this indirect domination in the
context of coopera.tive characteristic function form games. On the basis of Harsanyi's idea, we
define the following indirect dominance rela.tion on the outcome space.24
Ucfinilion 7.ti (Indirect domination): For x,y E X,x indirectly dominates y, denoted by
xidotny, if there exist a sPquence of pairs of actions y - xu,xt,.. .,xn` - x and the correspond-
ing sequencc of players it,...,im such that for all k- 1,2,...,m,ik ~ ik-t,xk ~~;. xk-t and
tL~k(x) i LL;k(xk-t).
Since there may exist various sequences of action pairs, Harsanyi proposed to pick up a particu-
lar one which may be supported by an equilibrium of an appropriately constructed noncoopera-
tive bargaining game.' The game models players' negotiation on how to distribute the amount
that the grand coalition can gain. In parallel with the Harsanyi's approach, we consider the
extended game with preplays, and pick up a particular sequence of indirect domination which
is supported b,y a CMPEg
Definition 7.4 (Effective domination): Take a CMPE p of the extended game P(e, 1) or T(e, 2).
For x,y E X,z effectively dominates y under p, denoted xedom(p)y, if (1) xdomy, or (2)
xidomy with a sequence ot action pairs y- xu,x~,...,xn` - x and a sequence of players
tit,...,i"` such that xk - p;k(xk-t ) for k- 2,...,m.
Definition 7.5(Effectively stable set) A set V(p) C X is an effectively stable set under p if the
Collowing two conditions are satisfied. (1) For an,y two outcomes x, y in V( p), neither xedom(p)y
nor yedorn(p)x; and (2) for any z not in V(p), there exists x E V(p) such that xedom(p)z. (1)
and (2) are called internal effective stability and external effective stability, respectively.
It is easily seen that in the ga.mes studied in this paper, except the battle of the sexes, the sets
Ií(p) of stable outcomes under CMPE p are eflectively stable sets: {CC, DD} in the prisoner's
dilemma, {UL} in the pure coordination game, the monopoly price pair in the price-setting
duopoly, and each of the monotone continuous curves in the continuous prisoner's dilemma.
In general, K(p) always satisfies the internal effective stability as the next proposition shows.
7Another approach to resolve the multiplicity of sequence~s is to take the peaeimistic or the optimistic one to
the iuitial deviator. See Chwe [l99?].
BThe Harsanyi's bargaining game aa umea the existence of a chairman who deeignatea a coalition to propoee
a new oR'er. We do not take this approach since we would like to avoid the difficulty who pays the chairman's
payoff.25
Proposition 7.1: Let p 6e a CMPE, and take the set Ií(p) oj its stab[e outrnmes under p:
li(p) is the set of action pairs in which neither player moves under p. Reca(! the definition in
Section 4.4. Then lí(p) satisfies the effective interna! stability.
Proof: Take two outcomes x,y E K(p), and suppose xedom(p)y. Then (1) zdomy or (2)
ridomy with a sequence ot outcomes y - xo,xt,...,xm - x and a corresponding sequence of
pla.yen it,...,i"' such that xk - p;k(tA-t ) for k- 2,...,m. Suppose (1) is the case. W.l.o.g.
let xdonxty. Then xZ - y2 and ui(x) 1 ut(y). Since x E 1í(p),p;(x) - x;,i - 1,2. Thus player
1 can improve his payoff by changing pt(y) from yt to xt, contradicting that p is a CMPE. A
similar proof is applied to the case (2). Q.E.D.
Recall in the battle of the sexes of Section 4.3, Ií(p) is empty. Thus lí(p) does not satisfy
the external stability. One sufficient condition for K(p) to satisfy the external eSective stability
is given in the next proposition.
Proposition 7.2: het p be a C~LIPE and lí(p) be the set of its stable outcomes under p.
5'uppose there is ao aequenre (cycleJ ojoutcomes za,xt,...,xm - xo such that xk - p;k(xk-t)
for k- 1,...,rn, ik ~ ik-t,k - 1,...,m - 1, and it - i"`. Then Ií(p) satisfies also externa!
effective stablily, and tMts ii is an efjectively stable set.
Proof: 1'ako any s-(-i, zx) ~ h (P). W.Lo.g. assume pt(z) ~ zt. Since p is a CMPE,
there exists a final outcome x-(xt,xZ) of the subgame I'(z,l). Lct the sequence of outcomes
from z to x under p be z- xv,xt,...,x"` - x; and let the corresponding sequence of players
be 1- i~,...,im. Then xedam(p)w because of the conservativeness of p. Thus if x E lí(p),
then the proof is done. Suppose x~ K(p). Suppose first i"` - 1. Then the game ends at
player 2's turn and p2(x) - x2. Since x~ Ií(p), we have pt(x) ~ zt. Let pl(x) - y1 and
let x'"ft -(yt,x2). Then by the condition mentioned in the proposition xmtt ~ xk for even
k's. Furthermore, we never have xmtt - xk for odd k's. In fact, if it is the case, the subgame
I'(xn`, 1) ends at xm; and thus pt(z) ~ zt contradicts the conservativeness of pt. Thus we
obtain x"`t~ ~ xk for k- O,1,..., m. If player 1 changes pt(x"`-t ) from xt to yr, then he can
improve his pa,yoíf in the snbgame I'(z"`-~, 1) contradicting that p is a CMPE. In fact, let x'zs
bo t.hi, (inal payo(f nndr~r p iu the subgame I'(r."'tr,'1). Then b,y the conscrvat.iveness we have
ict(x') ~ u~(xm). A sirnilar proof applies when im -'l. Q.E.D.
Reneurk 7.1: In the battle of the sexes, there exist cycles DR -a UR y DR w.r.t. player
1 and UL y UR --~ l~l, w.r.t. player 2. Recall Figure 4.3.
8 Concluding Remarks
We have studied the validity of the al[ernating-move preplay process proposed by Bhaskar
[1989] in general two-person games. The preplay works well in the prisoner's dilemma, a pure
coordination game, and a price-setting duopoly game. It has been shown, however, that in the
mixed extension of the prisoner's dilemma a sort of the Folk Theorem holds. We have further
examined relations between the vN -~1 stable set in strategic form games and equilibria in
their extension with preplays. It has been shown that the set of outcomes, in which neither
ptayer has an incentive to deviate in equilibrium, always satisfies the internal effective stability;
but it satisfies the external effective stability only when some conditions hold.
We conclude the pa.per with the following questions related to this research which merit
future studies.
'I'he first question concerns the assmnption that pla,yers get zero payoff when the game goes
on indcfinitely. Though it was used in previous studics, Bhaskar [1989], Ifarsanyi [1974], etc.,
the assumption is rather artificial. One way to avoid the assumption is to introduce a small
probabilit,y that the game terminates at the end of each period of preplays. Then the game
ends in a finite number of steps with probability one; and expected payoffs ca.n be calculated
for all strategy combinations.
The second question also concerns the rule of preplays. The question is whether or not one
may find a preplay process which invalidates the Folk Theorem in the continuous prisoner's
dilemtna. One possible way is to change the stopping rule so that the preplay ends only
when both players choose not to move. Another possibility is to introduce simultaneous moves
likc the aic proposed by I~alai (19R1]. As we saw in the battle of the sexes, final outcomes
ma,y depend ou which player moves first in the alternating-move preplays. Simultaneous-move
preplays may also avoid this difficulty.27
'1'he third aud the last question is on equilibrium outcomes in a quantity-setting duopoly.
It can be shown that earh joint profit maximizing quantit,y pair is attained as the unique final
outcome of a C'NPE: the proof is similar to that in the price-setting duopoly. But it is not
certain whether or not there exist any other equilibrium outcomes.
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